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1 Accessibility in Stalnaker 1968
A part of Stalnaker (1968)’s influential theory of conditionals has been neglected,
namely the role for an accessibility relation between worlds. I believe this is because
the accessibility relation does not play the role intended for it in the theory as stated.
I propose a minimal revision which solves the problem, and brings the theory in line
with the formulation in Stalnaker & Thomason 1970.
In Stalnaker’s theory, a conditional A > B is evaluated relative to a model struc-
ture and a selection function.1 A model structureM is a triple 〈K,R,λ 〉, where K
is a set of possible worlds; R is a reflexive binary accessibility relation on K, with
αRβ read ‘β is possible with respect to α’; and λ is the absurd world where every
sentence is true, accessible from no other world under R. A selection function f is a
function which takes a sentence and a world as its arguments, and returns a world as
its value. Relative to a background modelM and accessibility relation f , A > B is
true in α iff B is true in f (A,α). Stalnaker imposes four conditions on f (the names
are later additions):
(1) Success: For all antecedents A and base worlds α , A must be true in f (A,α).
* Thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal and my editor, Thony Gillies, and to Daniel
Rothschild and Robert Stalnaker, for very helpful discussion.
1 I omit corner quotes for readability.
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(2) Absurdity: For all antecedents A and base worlds α , f (A,α) = λ only if
there is no world possible with respect to α in which A is true.
(3) Strong Centering: For all antecedents A and base worlds α , if A is true in α ,
then f (A,α) = α .
(4) CSO: For all base worlds α and all antecedents B and B′, if B is true in
f (B′,α) and B′ is true in f (B,α), then f (B,α) = f (B′,α).
The accessibility relation R figures only in the second condition, Absurdity.
This condition does not seem to be strong enough, however. Later in the paper,
Stalnaker proposes that we can define the ordinary modal operators  and ♦ out of
his conditional semantics. In particular, he proposes this definition for :
Defined Semantics: A =DF ¬A > A
Now, if  is meant to receive its ordinary semantic interpretation, then we should
also have the following truth conditions, relative to a model structure 〈K,R,λ 〉:
Standard Semantics: A is true at α iff ∀β : αRβ → A is true at β
Stalnaker is not explicit that he intends  to receive the Standard Semantics, but he
uses  in an altogether standard way (for instance, in defining the strict conditional).
So we should expect Standard Semantics to match Defined Semantics.
But it doesn’t: if A is true according to the Defined Semantics, then it is true
according to the Standard Semantics, but not vice versa. Suppose that A is true
at α on Defined Semantics. Then ¬A > A is true at α , which can only hold if
f (¬A,α) = λ , which, according to Absurdity, only holds if all the worlds accessible
from α make ¬A false, which guarantees that all the worlds accessible from α make
A true, so A is true according to Standard Semantics. But now suppose that A is
true on Standard Semantics. Then every world accessible from α makes A true. It
is consistent with all the conditions above, however, that f (¬A,α) is some world
β 6= λ which makes ¬A true. Given the assumption that all the worlds accessible
from α make A true, β is not accessible from α under R; but nothing rules out a
situation in which β is nonetheless selected as the closest ¬A-world. In other words,
given the conditions as stated, inaccessible, non-absurd worlds can be selected. In
that case, ¬A > A will not be true at α , and so according to the Defined Semantics,
A will be false. Thus Defined Semantics comes apart from Standard Semantics.
For a simple model of this divergence, let K = {α,β ,λ}, with A true at α and
false at β . Let R = {〈α,α〉 ,〈β ,β 〉 ,〈λ ,λ 〉}. Let f (¬A,α) = β . This model is clearly
consistent with all the constraints above. According to Standard Semantics, A is
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true at α , since α can only access A-worlds. But according to Defined Semantics,
A is false at α , since ¬A > A is false at α , since A is false at f (¬A,α) = β .
2 The missing ‘If’
The accessibility relation thus seems not to be doing enough in Stalnaker’s semantics.
The proper role for the accessibility relation seems to me to be the following:
Accessibility: For all antecedents A and worlds α , if there is some
world β such that αRβ and β makes A true, then α must access
f (A,α) under R; otherwise f (A,α) = λ .
That is, f should always take us to an accessible world, if it’s possible to do so while
satisfying Success, and otherwise must take us to λ . Accessibility does not follow
from Stalnaker’s conditions: the toy model just given is a countermodel, since α
does not access any ¬A-world under R, but f (¬A,α) 6= λ .
There are two reasons to think that Accessibility gives the accessibility relation
its proper role in Stalnaker’s semantics. First, Accessibility is exactly what we need to
render Defined Semantics equivalent to Standard Semantics.2 Second, Accessibility
is entailed by the semantics given in Stalnaker & Thomason 1970, which is a
formal companion to Stalnaker 1968 whose goal is to extend the formal treatment
of the theory given in Stalnaker 1968. In the propositional fragment of Stalnaker
& Thomason (1970)’s system, the four conditions on selection functions and the
semantic clauses are all equivalent to those in Stalnaker 1968. There is one crucial
difference, however: in the definition of selection functions, Stalnaker & Thomason
(1970) stipulate that for all A and α , if f (A,α) 6= λ , then αR f (A,α). I’ll refer to
this stipulation by its heading in Stalnaker & Thomason 1970, namely D3.4.
D3.4 entails Accessibility, given Stalnaker’s other conditions. Actually, it is
strictly more than we need: all that we need is the stipulation that, if f (A,α) 6= λ ,
2 Accessibility obviously renders these equivalent. To see that the failure of Accessibility lets these
diverge, suppose Accessibility is false. Then for some antecedent A and world α , either there is some
world β such that αRβ and β makes A true, f (A,α) = γ for some world γ , and ¬αRγ . Note first
that, by Absurdity, γ 6= λ , since there is an accessible A world from α . Now let {γ} be the proposition
true just at γ and λ and false everywhere else in K (for convenience, we also use {γ} to denote the
sentence true just at γ and λ and false everywhere else in K). By Success, f ({γ},α) is either γ or
λ . But it can’t be λ . For since A is true in λ and {γ} true in λ , by CSO it would follow that γ = λ ,
contrary to what we have shown. So f ({γ},α) = γ . It follows that {γ}> ¬{γ} is false at α , and so
¬{γ} is false at α according to Defined Semantics. But now note that since ¬αRγ and ¬αRλ , we
have ¬{γ} true at α according to Standard Semantics. Or there is no world β such that αRβ and β
makes A true, and f (A,α) = γ 6= λ . By Success, A is true in γ , and since γ 6= λ , ¬A is thus false in γ ,
so A > ¬A is false in α . Thus ¬A is false in α according to Defined Semantics; but it is true in α
according to Standard Semantics.
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then there is a world possible with respect to α in which A is true (this follows from
D3.4 given Success, but not vice versa). Note that this, in turn, is just the converse
of Absurdity. And so all we need to get to Accessibility from Stalnaker (1968)’s
formulation is an extra ‘if’ in Absurdity, as follows:
Absurdity Biconditional: For all antecedents A and base worlds α ,
f (A,α) = λ if and only if there is no world possible with respect to
α in which A is true.
Given Stalnaker’s other conditions, Absurdity Biconditional entails Accessibility;3
and D3.4 follows immediately from Accessibility.
Thus we should replace Absurdity with Absurdity Biconditional. This gives the
accessibility relation the role that it seemed destined for, and it brings Stalnaker
(1968)’s informal exposition in line with Stalnaker & Thomason (1970)’s formal
development. This has two upshots, both of them small but worth noting. First,
we should treat Stalnaker & Thomason (1970)’s exposition, rather than Stalnaker
(1968)’s, as canonical. Second, in the subsequent literature, Stalnaker’s accessibility
relation has been largely ignored (perhaps partly because of the limited role that it
played in the theory as stated). But in more recent literature, it has been recognized
that an accessibility relation of some kind may play an important role in the theory of
conditionals. For instance, an accessibility relation may play a role in distinguishing
indicative from subjunctive conditionals (Stalnaker 1975, von Fintel 1998); and an
accessibility relation may play a role in accounting for reverse Sobel sequences
(von Fintel 2001, Gillies 2007, Williams 2008, Moss 2012). The idea that the
interpretation of conditionals depends not only on a selection function of some sort
but also on an accessibility relation was already present in Stalnaker 1968 — albeit
missing an ‘if’.
3 Suppose first that there is some world β such that αRβ and β makes A true. Suppose next for reductio
that f (A,α) = γ and ¬αRγ . We know by the left-to-right direction of Absurdity Biconditional that
γ 6= λ . Now consider what f ({γ},α) is (where {γ} again stands for the sentence true at γ and λ
and false everywhere else in K). Since by assumption ¬αRγ , the right-to-left direction of Absurdity
Biconditional entails that f ({γ},α) = λ . But now note that A is true at the closest {γ}-world, λ ; and
{γ} is true at the closest A world, namely γ ; and so by CSO, γ must be λ , contrary to our assumption.
So our assumption for reductio is discharged, and we conclude that αRγ , as required by Accessibility.
Suppose next that there is no world β such that αRβ and β makes A true. Then the right-to-left
direction of Absurdity Biconditional immediately entails that f (A,α) = λ , as desired.
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